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I try to keep things simple. This is probably the combined result of having
taught technical writing for too long.
So I will start with the most important point. I like what Dr. Goodwin has done
here and I think she has made some useful and interesting points. And, since
my understanding of my job is to take her paper and use it as a springboard for
further discussion, that is what I will now do.
When I first started reading "Cicero’s Authority," my initial feeling was "But isn’t
all this just ethos?" Why doesn’t Dr. Goodwin just say something like "It is
significant that much of the legal rhetoric from the Roman period focuses on
the ethos of the person defending the accused?" In fact, I do not recall seeing
the word "ethos" in the draft version of the paper. Having read through the
paper more carefully, I think there are reasons why Dr. Goodwin did this,
although she does not put it in the terms I would use. And her reasons may be
different than the ones I would have had in this situation. This is not an
accusation; it is simply an observation.
One of the points in Dr. Goodwin’s paper that I see worth examining is the
implied relationships between the three types of Aristotelian appeals. It is easy
to see ethos, logos, and pathos as discreet types of argument, incapable of
being blended. However, as most of us know, if we examine real arguments
we find almost immediately cases where the appeal only works because of a
combination of multiple appeals or because other appeals are part of the
context within which the appeal we are presently examining exists. Or, to put
the latter point more simply, many logical appeals succeed only because of an
ethical appeal that has been made earlier, even though it is not part of the
logical appeal itself.
The distinction between the three kinds of appeals is often unclear. The
boundary between logos and pathos is very fuzzy. Is duty a logical appeal or an
emotional one? Taking a cue from James Kinneavy, my solution to the problem
is to treat "logic" and "emotion" as "subject" and "audience." Logos now
covers arguments that are either specific to the subject or somehow universal
(virtually all audiences have a rational aversion to inefficiency, although for
some it is also a matter of passion as well) while pathos covers arguments that
are specific to the audience. This, I think, makes it easier to classify and
understand the arguments, although one could argue that ultimately all rational
arguments are based in ideological assumptions about reality, making all
logos a branch of pathos.
What is significant about Dr. Goodwin’s paper is that is examines a rhetorical
appeal where ethos and logos become intertwined. Ethos has, of course, been
limited to the speaker rather than the subject, but when the speaker is the
subject, is ethos actually ethos or is it logos? (Or pathos?) Perhaps this is
where some of the confusion about appeals to dignity or authority come from—
the fact that the subject of the logos is actually ethos. And, of course, the fact
that this is an appeal to behavior rather than belief, an appeal that implies the
audience should in some cases surrender its integrity and jump through a hoop
being offered by authority rather than face the possible consequences.
I would now like to talk about the actual rhetorical transactions involved in
cases of dignity. First, we can think of dignity originating with either office,
symbol, or reputation. That is, a person may be dignified because of an official
position that they hold, like the Presidency. They may be dignified because
they have used various culturally appropriate symbols, perhaps as simple as
$1,000 Italian suit, which shouts a certain kind of authority in our faces. Finally,
a person may be dignified because of their reputation for knowledge,
experience, and so on. In all three cases, the social blackmail-and-bond logic
seems quite plausible.
To shed what I hope will be some additional light on this point, I will view the
transaction through another lens. I tend to think of persuasion in terms of costs
and benefits. The cost of deferring to the dignified is, of course, agreeing with
them, although this may mean downplaying your own position in public. The
cost is not to belief but to behavior. The benefit is that one avoids risk. It is risky
to challenge an authority figure. Social costs may include damage to your own
reputation and payback later on if the person you have attacked has powerful
friends. You can be seen as a no-nothing jerk. You can also become a pariah.
In any situation where social bonds are very important—such as an academic
community—this is a very important factor.
The bond aspect is another benefit. Because the bond is offered, one also in
effect avoids risk of embarrassment. If I agree with the expert, this argument
says, I will avoid looking rude or looking like a fool, and I can be pretty sure that
I will not look like a fool later on because this expert would not support this point
so strongly if she did not believe it. And, if she is proved wrong later on, I can
always lay blame on her, pleading that it was her strong conviction and her
reputation as an expert that won me over.
When dignity comes not only from reputation or symbol but also from office, we
have a similar situation, although the issue of coercion becomes more evident.
I think if we going to discuss dignity, we need to clearly distinguish it from
authority. Dignity is, after all, a matter of respect, of what Kenneth Burke would
call the rhetorical magic of social hierarchy, while authority need not be based
in respect; it may only need power. As an example, whether or not you respect
William Jefferson Clinton, he does have the legal and constitutional authority to
tell the cruiser Philippine Sea to fire a volley of missiles at Yugoslavia.
Power makes a difference in our transactions. Telling James Kinneavy or
Wayne Booth that he’s a moron about something when he is making a
presentation might make you less popular at some of the conference parties,
and there may be other consequences, but perhaps there will not be any at all.
These elder statesmen of our field do not, after all, have any legal power over
us. Telling the police officer who has just pulled you over for speeding that he’s
a moron might have more immediate and less pleasant effects.
Now we move to a different subject. I always look for practical applications. All
this chit chat about Cicero and dignity is very nice, but how does it help me? I
am going to list a few possible future directions for this topic.
First, as a teacher, the whole concept of dignity in communications is worth
some attention. What is "dignity" or a postmodern version of it? Are there,
perhaps, different flavors of dignity created by the dignitary’s position, office,
standing, or profession? Is a doctor more dignified than an engineer? Is a
surgeon more dignified than a dermatologist? Can dignity be earned or must it
be granted by the discourse communities in which we find ourselves? How do
we know if we have dignity? How do we know if we are on our way? How do
we know if we have lost it? What new strategies does the concept of dignity
imply for communication? How can we use our understanding of dignity and
our understanding of whether certain people have it in our communications?
Do variations of dignity create variations for these strategies?
You can spend an entire course on dignity.
And not all teaching goes on in the classroom. We can do consulting and
continuing education. Dignity workshops? Can we bottle this? Maybe. If we
can, the money’s gonna roll in. Because dignity is like heroin. Once you have a
little taste, you always want more and you always want a steady supply.
I will close with how this might be applied to scholarship. Hmmm....let’s see.
Working title: The Rhetoric and Dignity of...oh, I’ll figure out who later. The
name does not really matter. You can apply the lens to anyone. They all had
some kind of dignity, waiting to be discussed. The trope, and the readiness, is
all.
